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KNIGHT V. THOMPSON: THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S 
PERPETUATION OF HISTORICAL PRACTICES OF 
COLONIZATION 
Randi Dawn Gardner Hardin* 
I. Introduction 
In the case Knight v. Thompson, Ricky Knight and several other 
plaintiffs sued the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC) over its 
severely restrictive grooming policy, asserting that the policy impermissibly 
violated the Religious Exercise in Land Use and by Institutionalized 
Persons Act (RLUIPA) and infringed upon the plaintiffs’ rights to wear 
their hair in accordance with their religious beliefs. The ADOC instituted a 
policy to promote health and safety within its prison system that “requires 
all male prison inmates to wear a regular hair cut . . . off the neck and 
ears.”1 The ADOC does not allow any exceptions to this policy for any 
reason.2 However, many people follow religions that dictate they maintain 
long hair, including Ricky Knight—a Native American who believes that 
“wearing long hair is a central tenant of [his] religious faith.”3 
Many states impose hygiene standards for inmates, but few refuse to 
allow inmates the ability to groom themselves as mandated by their 
religion.4 Congress enacted the RLUIPA in order to protect inmates from 
arbitrary policies that prevent the exercise of their religious beliefs. In an 
attempt to secure his rights to wear his hair in accordance with his religion, 
Knight sued the ADOC on the basis that their strict grooming policy 
violated the RLUIPA.  
The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the policies of the ADOC, and ruled that 
even though there was a substantial burden upon Knight’s right to practice 
his religion, the ADOC’s policies were permissible and did not violate the 
RLUIPA. In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit ignored the requirements of the 
RLUIPA in order to uphold the policy of the ADOC. 
Part II of this paper discusses the law prior to this case, including the 
First Amendment, the RLUIPA, and how courts have interpreted the 
                                                                                                                 
 * Second-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. 
 1. Knight v. Thompson, 723 F.3d 1275, 1277 (11th Cir. 2013). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Dawinder S. Sidhu, Religious Freedom and Inmate Grooming Standards, 66 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 923, 927 (2012). 
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RLUIPA. Part III describes the facts of this case, the primary issues, and the 
Eleventh Circuit’s holding that the ADOC did not violate the RLUIPA. Part 
IV discusses how the court reached its decision. Part V analyzes how the 
court erred by giving excessive deference to the ADOC and imposing the 
ADOC’s burden of proof on Knight; the negative implications that will 
result due to the continued allowance of policies which infringe upon the 
religious exercise of inmates; and how the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling further 
perpetuates the United States’ historical practices of colonization to the 
detriment of Native Americans. 
II. Law Before Knight v. Thompson 
The idea of “freedom of religion” is one of the founding principles of the 
United States. The Founding Fathers of our country codified this belief 
within the U.S. Constitution, further solidifying this standard within 
American culture and law. This country’s strong policy of permitting 
unfettered religious practice continues today, and the U.S. Supreme Court 
has upheld this tenet numerous times. The Supreme Court has stated, “no 
liberty is more essential . . . than is the religious liberty protected by the 
Free Exercise Clause.”5 However, the U.S. government and its courts have, 
at times, violated this sacred principle by allowing unchecked violations of 
religious freedoms to stand uncorrected. When the courts allow 
degradations of private citizens’ religious rights to continue in direct 
contradiction to the Constitution, they impermissibly endanger the rights of 
all U.S. citizens, and fail to uphold the philosophy upon which this country 
was established. 
A. Federal Constitutional Protections for Religious Beliefs 
 The First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause states, “Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof.”6 The First Amendment works to protect against undue 
governmental regulation of religious beliefs. “Government may neither 
compel affirmation of a repugnant belief . . . nor penalize or discriminate 
against individuals or groups because they hold religious views abhorrent to 
the authorities.”7 The government must refrain from regulating religious 
acts which do not “pose[] some substantial threat to public safety, peace or 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 413 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 7. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402 (citations omitted). 
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order.”8 When a law puts a person in a position where they have to choose 
between complying with the law and complying with the principles of their 
faith, it violates the Free Exercise Clause.9 
The hallmark of modern First Amendment interpretation comes from 
Sherbert v. Verner, where the Supreme Court stated that only a compelling 
government interest would justify a law that substantially infringes on an 
individual’s religious rights.10 The Court held that the state of South 
Carolina violated the Free Exercise Clause by denying unemployment 
benefits to the Plaintiff.11 The Plaintiff refused to take employment 
requiring Saturday work in accordance with her religious beliefs, and 
although South Carolina gave unemployment benefits to people who 
refused to work on Sundays for religious reasons, it did not afford the same 
exception for those who observed the Sabbath on other days.12 The Court 
adopted a balancing test akin to strict scrutiny, weighing the burden of 
imposition on the Plaintiff’s beliefs against the interests of the government, 
and found that South Carolina could not deny unemployment benefits to the 
Plaintiff as this made her choose between adhering to her faith and 
receiving a government benefit.13 
Later, in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of 
Oregon v. Smith, the Supreme Court deviated from this high standard and 
severely limited the application of the Free Exercise Clause.14 The Court 
declared that Oregon could deny unemployment benefits to the Plaintiffs 
after they were fired for ingesting peyote—a Schedule I narcotic15—in 
accordance with their beliefs and practices as members of the Native 
American Church.16 The Court held that laws which prohibit conduct may 
enjoin an individual’s right to practice their religion so long as the law itself 
is not unconstitutional on other grounds, and “that the right of free exercise 
does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with . . . valid and 
neutral” laws “of general applicability” conflicting with the individual’s 
religious beliefs.17 
                                                                                                                 
 8. Id. at 403 (citations omitted). 
 9. Id. at 406. 
 10. Id. at 406, 407. 
 11. Id. at 410. 
 12. Id. at 401-02. 
 13. Id. at 403. 
 14. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 15. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2012). 
 16. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874, 890. 
 17. Id. at 879, 890. 
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B. Congressional Response to Smith and Subsequent Statutory Law 
In response to the Court’s decision in Smith, Congress enacted the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA),18 which reinstated the 
Sherbert test requiring strict scrutiny. Under the RFRA, the “Government 
shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion” unless the law 
in question “(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental 
interest.”19 The RFRA initially applied to the states under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but the Court later held that the RFRA could not be imposed 
upon states under the Fourteenth Amendment alone.20 
Congress then enacted the Religious Exercise in Land Use and by 
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) after the Supreme Court held that 
the RFRA was unconstitutional as applied to states.21 Congress passed the 
RLUIPA in order to protect individual’s religious rights from burdens 
imposed by governmental policies, especially for inmates, who depend on 
the government to accommodate their religious beliefs and practices.22 It 
states,  
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the 
religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an 
institution . . . even . . . from a rule of general applicability, 
unless . . .  
(1) [it] is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and 
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
government interest.23 
Congress meant for the RLUIPA to break down the “‘frivolous or arbitrary’ 
barriers imped[ing] institutionalized persons’ religious exercise.”24 
The standards of review are the same for the RLUIPA as they were for 
the RFRA, but the RLUIPA’s scope is much more limited, applying only to 
land use regulations and religious exercise of inmates.25 The RLUIPA is a 
valid exercise of Congress’ powers under the Spending Clause, which 
                                                                                                                 
 18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012). 
 19. Id. § 2000bb-1(a)-(b). 
 20. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997). 
 21. Sidhu, supra note 4, at 933. 
 22. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 721 (2005). 
 23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (2012). 
 24. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 716. 
 25. Id. at 714. 
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permits Congress to place limitations when it offers federal funds to states 
to promote the general welfare of citizens.26 The RLUIPA falls under the 
Spending Clause authority by working to protect “prisoners’ religious rights 
and to promote the rehabilitation of prisoners.”27 Congress has the authority 
to condition the receipt of federal funds by states by allowing the states to 
either (1) choose to receive the money and comply with federal law, or (2) 
choose to refuse the federal funds and refrain from instituting the federal 
law.28 In the case at hand, Alabama chose to accept federal funding for its 
prisons; therefore, Alabama is bound to follow the RLUIPA.29 
The RLUIPA balances the substantial burden certain policies place on 
the exercise of religious rights by prisoners with the need of correctional 
facilities to maintain order. In doing so, it imposes strict scrutiny upon laws 
that burden religious practice.30 Under the RLUIPA, the plaintiff must first 
prove “(1) that an institutionalized person’s religious exercise has been 
burdened and (2) that the burden is substantial . . .”31 Once the plaintiff 
proves these two elements, the burden shifts “to the government to show (3) 
that the burden furthers a compelling governmental interest and (4) that the 
burden is the least restrictive means of achieving that compelling 
interest.”32 A court should defer to the expertise of prison officials as they 
are more aware of the particular requirements to maintain order and safety 
within correctional facilities,33 but this level of deference does not allow the 
government to make mere conclusory statements to justify its regulations.34 
Empty references to safety and security will not suffice to fulfill the high 
standard that the RLUIPA sets.35 Instead, the government’s policy must 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601, 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 27. Id. at 607. 
 28. Id. at 608. 
 29. For comparison as to why the RLUIPA binds the state to adopt the least restrictive 
means test, see id. at 608 (“If the DOC objected to the imposition of the least restrictive 
means test, it certainly could have refused federal funding.”). 
 30. Fegans v. Norris, 537 F.3d 897, 908 (8th Cir. 2008) (Melloy, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc 1(a) (2012)). 
 31. Spratt v. R.I. Dep't of Corr., 482 F.3d 33, 38 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 32. Id.  
 33. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723 (2005) (citing 146 CONG. REC. 16698, 
16699 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy on RLUIPA)). 
 34. See id. at 722-23; see also Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir. 
2005). 
 35. See Couch v. Jabe, 679 F.3d 197, 204 (4th Cir. 2012); Smith v. Ozmint, 578 F.3d 
246, 253 (4th Cir. 2009); Spratt, 482 F.3d at 42, 43; Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 283 
(3d Cir. 2007); Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 998. 
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actually be the least restrictive means of achieving their compelling interest 
as applied to the case at hand.36  
Most jurisdictions have recognized that inmates have the right to groom 
themselves in accordance with their religious mandates.37 Only eleven 
states have restrictive hair policies preventing male inmates from 
maintaining hair in accordance with their beliefs, whereas thirty-nine states, 
the District of Columbia, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons all have 
grooming policies that either do not mandate the length of male inmates’ 
hair or allow for religious exemptions.38 The eleven states that restrict an 
inmate’s ability to control his or her own hair cite reasons including 
identification, health, and order in explaining why they must maintain strict 
grooming standards.39 
Although substantive statutory law exists concerning both Native 
American religious rights and inmate religious rights, the law in this area 
inadequately protects the rights of Native American prisoners to engage in 
religious practices. Likewise, case law in this area fails to fully afford 
nationwide protections for Native American prisoners. “Native religious 
traditions . . . are religions . . . of ritual practice” and because the Free 
Exercise Clause focuses on religious beliefs and not necessarily religious 
practices, “the First Amendment and the concept of religion it embodies can 
never afford full protection to Native religious traditions.”40 The RLUIPA 
aims to protect religious exercise of inmates, and therefore better conforms 
to Native American religious viewpoints. However, courts have interpreted 
the RLUIPA differently in jurisdictions across the nation, and while most 
correctional institutions subject to the RLUIPA accommodate the religious 
grooming needs of their inmates, the Eleventh Circuit has systematically 
and repeatedly failed to live up to its obligations under the RLUIPA. 
                                                                                                                 
 36. Fegans v. Norris, 537 F.3d 897, 908-09 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 37. See Sidhu, supra note 4, at 927, 964-70 (noting the following jurisdictions without 
grooming restrictions or allowing religious exemptions to grooming policies: The Federal 
Bureau of Prisons, District of Columbia, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, 
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 926. 
 40. JACE WEAVER, OTHER WORDS: AMERICAN INDIAN LITERATURE, LAW, AND CULTURE 
179-80 (2001).  
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C. The Eleventh Circuit’s Application of the RLUIPA 
The Eleventh Circuit has routinely ruled in favor of correctional facilities 
grooming policies and against prisoner rights, both under the RFRA and 
under the RLUIPA. For example, in Harris v. Chapman41 the Plaintiff, an 
inmate at the Martin Correctional Institution (MCI), sued MCI under the 
RFRA for violating his rights to exercise his religious beliefs.42 The 
Plaintiff was a Rastafarian and believed that he must keep his hair and 
beard unshorn; he refused to comply with MCI’s strict grooming policy 
requiring male inmates to keep their hair above the collar line and remain 
clean-shaven.43 In return, the correctional officers at MCI held the Plaintiff 
down against his will while another inmate cut off his dreadlocks.44 The 
court assumed the policy was a substantial burden on the Plaintiff’s 
religious exercise, and likewise, summarily stated that MCI had a 
compelling interest in upholding the grooming policy.45 In regards to 
whether the policy was the least restrictive means of furthering that interest, 
the court shifted the burden from MCI to the Plaintiff.46 The court stated 
that because it could not imagine less restrictive means, and because the 
Plaintiff had not proposed any less restrictive means, the regulation passed 
that prong of the RFRA test.47 This same standard was later applied to 
claims arising under the RLUIPA, as the Eleventh Circuit later recognized 
the two statutes impose the same standard upon governmental policies that 
burden religious exercise.48 
The Eleventh Circuit has not always consistently contradicted the 
standards set under the RFRA and the RLUIPA and has, at least on one 
occasion, recognized that the RLUIPA imposes a higher burden upon 
governmental policies burdening prisoner’s religious exercise.49 Two 
months before the Eleventh Circuit decided Knight, it held that the Florida 
Department of Corrections (FDC) had the burden to demonstrate its policy 
                                                                                                                 
 41. Harris v. Chapman, 97 F.3d 499 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 42. Id. at 502. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 503-04. 
 46. Id. at 504. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Muhammad v. Sapp, 494 F. App’x 953, 956 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 49. Rich v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 716 F.3d 525, 532 (11th Cir. 2013) (finding that 
the Florida Department of Corrections bears the burden to prove its policy furthers a 
compelling governmental interest with the least restrictive means; refusing to find 
conclusory statements alone sufficient to fulfill this burden). 
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of denying kosher meals to Jewish inmates was the least restrictive means 
of furthering its interests in security and cost control.50 The court stated that 
because the FDC could not explain why other institutions were able to 
provide kosher meals without having security concerns, its policy failed the 
least restrictive means test. It adopted the standard found in Warsoldier in 
regards to evidence from other penal institutions, and stated that, “[w]hile 
the practices at other institutions are not controlling, they are relevant to an 
inquiry about whether a particular restriction is the least restrictive means 
by which to further a shared interest.”51 
D. Interpretation of the RLUIPA by Other Federal Circuit Courts 
Other jurisdictions have found restrictive hair grooming policies violate 
the RLUIPA, including the Ninth Circuit, where the court held that the 
California Department of Correction’s (CDC) strict grooming policies were 
impermissibly restrictive.52 In Warsoldier, the Plaintiff—a Native 
American inmate—sued the CDC for infringing on his religious exercise 
after he was punished for violating the CDC’s grooming policy.53 The court 
found first that the CDC’s policy was a substantial burden on the Plaintiff’s 
religious beliefs, and then looked to whether the CDC could show that its 
policy was “both ‘in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest’ and 
the ‘least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental 
interest.’”54 To be upheld, the CDC’s policy had to clear both hurdles set by 
the RLUIPA. 
The court focused the majority of its analysis on whether the CDC had 
fulfilled its obligations to show the policy was the least restrictive means of 
achieving its goals, and found that the CDC had failed to do so.55 The 
CDC’s evidence included statements that all other regulations would be 
unworkable, but did “not elaborate why this is the case or what other modes 
of regulation it considered and rejected.”56 The court stated that the “CDC 
cannot meet its burden to prove least restrictive means unless it 
demonstrates that it has actually considered and rejected the efficacy of less 
restrictive measures before adopting the challenged practice.”57 Further, 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Id. at 528-29, 534. 
 51. Id. at 534. 
 52. Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 1002 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 53. Id. at 992. 
 54. Id. at 995. 
 55. Id. at 1001. 
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. at 999. 
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evidence showing that other penal institutions with similar interests had 
implemented less restrictive policies gave credence to the argument that the 
CDC’s policy was not the least restrictive means of furthering its interests.  
We have found comparisons between institutions analytically 
useful when considering whether the government is employing 
the least restrictive means. Indeed, the failure of a defendant to 
explain why another institution with the same compelling 
interests was able to accommodate the same religious practices 
may constitute a failure to establish that the defendant was using 
the least restrictive means . . . ‘prison officials must set forth 
detailed evidence, tailored to the situation before the court, that 
identifies the failings in the alternatives advanced by the 
prisoner.’58 
Because the CDC failed to meet its burden under the RLUIPA, the court 
overturned the policy as an undue burden on the Plaintiff’s religious rights. 
Other circuits—including the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits—
have also adopted this same standard.59 
III. Statement of the Case 
In the case Knight v. Thompson, the Eleventh Circuit analyzed whether 
the ADOC’s grooming policy, which requires male inmates to keep short 
hair, violated the RLUIPA by impermissibly infringing upon the religious 
exercise of Native American inmates whose faith dictated keeping long 
hair. 
A. Facts 
Ricky Knight,60 an inmate in custody of the ADOC, sought a religious 
exemption to the ADOC’s strict grooming policy, which “requires all male 
prison inmates to wear a regular hair cut, defined as off the neck and ears” 
without “any exemptions . . . religious or otherwise.”61 The ADOC cited 
several reasons for instituting the strict grooming standards, including 
“security, safety, control, order, uniformity, discipline, health, hygiene, 
                                                                                                                 
 58. Id. at 1000 (quoting May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 564-65 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
 59. Couch v. Jabe, 679 F.3d 197, 203 (4th Cir. 2012); Jova v. Smith, 582 F.3d 410, 416 
(2d Cir. 2009); Spratt v. R.I. Dep’t of Corr., 482 F.3d 33, 41 (1st Cir. 2007); Washington v. 
Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 284 (3d Cir. 2007).  
 60. Mr. Knight is the named plaintiff, although other inmates were also plaintiffs in the 
case. 
 61. Knight v. Thompson, 723 F.3d 1275, 1277 (11th Cir. 2013). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014
588 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
 
 
sanitation, cost-containment, and reducing health care costs.”62 Knight, a 
Native American, fought for an exemption to the male grooming policy for 
ten years, stating that it unduly burdened his religious practice “because 
wearing long hair is a central tenant of [his] religious faith.”63 He filed his 
first claim in 1993 under the RFRA, along with several other similarly 
situated male inmates.64 
B. Procedural History 
In addition to challenging the grooming policy, Knight and the other 
plaintiffs also challenged the ADOC’s policy prohibiting sweat lodges as 
violating their religious exercise rights.65 After the Supreme Court held that 
the RFRA was unconstitutional as it applied to states and after Congress 
enacted the RLUIPA, Knight amended his claim to reflect the change.66 
The district court ruled for summary judgment in favor of the ADOC, and 
Knight appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.67 The Eleventh Circuit upheld the 
ruling in favor of the ADOC for all causes of action except the challenge to 
the grooming policy, and remanded that claim to the district court.68 After 
the district court again ruled in favor of the ADOC, Knight again appealed 
to the Eleventh Circuit.69 
C. Holding 
In line with its prior decisions, the Eleventh Circuit held that although 
the ADOC’s policy undoubtedly significantly burdened Knight’s religious 
beliefs and practices, it was nevertheless permissible for the ADOC to 
maintain such strict grooming policies with no religious exemption under 
the RLUIPA.70 The court found that Knight had offered “extensive, 
undisputed testimony that long hair has great religious significance” which 
equated cutting his hair with “an assault on [his] sacredness.”71 The court 
summarily found that Knight had fulfilled his burdens under RLUIPA and, 
likewise, the ADOC had shown that it has a compelling interest in 
                                                                                                                 
 62. Id. at 1280. 
 63. Id. at 1277. 
 64. Id.  
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 1287. 
 71. Id. at 1283. 
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maintaining the safety and security of its facilities.72 “The crux of this 
appeal, then, is simply whether the ADOC’s blanket short-hair policy 
furthers those goals and is the least restrictive means of doing so.”73 
The court focused primarily on whether the testimony of the ADOC’s 
expert witnesses justified the continuation of the grooming policy. A court 
should give “due deference” to correctional facilities as noted in Cutter, but 
this deference is limited. Unlike in Warsoldier, where the Ninth Circuit 
stated that the correctional facility had to actually consider and reject 
alternatives in order for the policy to be found to be the least restrictive,74 
this court said “the RLUIPA . . . does not give courts carte blanche to 
second-guess the reasoned judgments of prison officials” and took the 
testimony of ADOC’s experts at face value.75 The RLUIPA imposes strict 
scrutiny on governmental policies that substantially burden inmate’s 
religious practices; therefore, these practices should only be upheld if there 
is no feasible alternative.76 The government bears the burden of proving 
that its questioned policy is necessary, and that it has no way of furthering 
its interest without the policy.77 However, in this case the Eleventh Circuit 
shifted this burden to Knight. 
IV. Decision of the Court 
In this case, because the ADOC testified that the alternatives to the 
grooming policy offered by Knight would not alleviate their concerns, the 
court found that the ADOC’s policy was the least restrictive means of 
furthering its interests.78 The court placed the burden upon Knight to prove 
that less restrictive alternatives existed, and dismissed the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding in Warsoldier requiring the government to bear the burden of 
proving no less restrictive alternatives exist.79 Here, because the ADOC did 
not show that less restrictive means existed, and because the ADOC 
testified that Knight’s alternatives did not further the ADOC’s interests, the 
court ruled that the ADOC’s substantially burdensome policy was 
permissible.80 
                                                                                                                 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 999 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 75. Knight, 723 F.3d at 1282-83. 
 76. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2012).  
 77. Id. 
 78. Knight, 723 F.3d at 1284-85. 
 79. Id. at 1284-86.  
 80. Id. at 1287. 
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The Eleventh Circuit justified its decision despite the overwhelming 
evidence presented by Knight showing that the majority of other 
jurisdictions maintain permissive grooming policies, which allow inmates 
to accommodate their religious beliefs. The court noted that although many 
other jurisdictions permit men to keep their hair in accordance with their 
religious beliefs, these jurisdictions have simply “elected to absorb [the] 
risks” associated with having a more permissive grooming policy.81 The 
evidence showing other jurisdictions have implemented permissive 
grooming policies was “some evidence” but not “dispositive evidence.”82 
Further, the court found the ADOC’s evidence concerning the severe 
overcrowding of its facilities combined with its lack of adequate staffing 
and funding as further proof that the ADOC had justifiable reasons for 
adopting policies incongruous with other jurisdictions. 
V. Analysis 
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision to uphold the restrictive policies of the 
ADOC strikes against the very nature of the RLUIPA. The court cited 
several reasons for upholding the policy, notably that it afforded due 
deference to the decisions of correctional officers and its prior precedence 
supported allowing the policy. The court further opined that, because 
Knight had not proven less restrictive means existed which would advance 
the ADOC’s purported goals, and because the ADOC had shown that each 
of Knight’s proposed alternatives was not feasible to pursue its goals, the 
ADOC had met its burden under the RLUIPA of showing no less restrictive 
means were available.  
A. Problems with the Eleventh Circuit’s Decision 
The court’s decision is flawed for a number of reasons. First and 
foremost, the court here misconstrues the RLUIPA’s requirement of 
affording due deference to correctional officers. The RLUIPA requires that 
no governmental entity impose burdens on a prisoner’s religious beliefs 
unless it is in furtherance of a compelling government interest, and is the 
least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest.83 
Further, although courts do owe deference to correctional officers, the 
RLUIPA must be construed broadly in favor of protecting religious rights 
                                                                                                                 
 81. Id. at 1286. 
 82. Id. at 1281. 
 83. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc(a)(1), 2000cc-2(b) (2012). 
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of inmates.84 The court here acknowledged that the ADOC bears the burden 
of proving that least restrictive means to achieving its interest do not exist. 
Yet, the court found that because Knight failed to show any viable less 
restrictive means existed, the ADOC had fulfilled its burden under the 
RLUIPA.  
The RLUIPA imposes a high burden on governmental policies seeking to 
infringe upon the religious rights of prisoners. The language “compelling 
government interest” and “least restrictive means” is indicative of 
Congress’ intent to apply strict scrutiny to governmental policies that 
inhibit prisoners’ religious rights.85 Thus, the RLUIPA requires the 
government to actually show that no alternatives exist to achieving their 
compelling interest. In order to fulfill its substantial burden, the court in 
Warsoldier stated the correctional facility “cannot meet its burden . . . 
unless it demonstrates that it has actually considered and rejected the 
efficacy of less restrictive measures before adopting the challenged 
practice.”86 As the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged, the First and Third 
Circuits, in addition to the Ninth Circuit, have also recently found this to be 
the proper standard for evaluating whether the government has met its 
burden of proving least restrictive means under the RLUIPA.87 The Second 
and Fourth Circuits have also held that prison officials must actually 
consider other alternatives prior to deciding a policy is the least restrictive 
means of achieving its goals.88 Yet the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the 
persuasive precedence of other circuits by implying this requirement is set 
higher than the standard set under the RLUIPA.89 The court said “[t]he 
RLUIPA asks only whether efficacious less restrictive measures actually 
exist, not whether the defendant considered alternatives to its policy,” 
despite the fact that it is “relatively less common” for corrections officers to 
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make “an appropriately tailored policy without first considering and 
rejecting the efficacy of less restrictive measures.”90 
In the case at hand, it was undisputed that “the ADOC never considered 
any less restrictive alternatives to its short-hair policy before adopting it,” 
and the ADOC witnesses “had never worked in—or reviewed the policies 
of—prison systems that allow long hair.”91 Yet the court ignored this 
evidence, and instead held that the ADOC had met its burden under the 
RLUIPA because it refuted Knight’s proffered alternatives and had not 
provided any evidence of the existence of alternatives itself.92 As shown by 
the language of the statute, the RLUIPA requires the court to utilize strict 
scrutiny when reviewing policies that significantly inhibit inmate’s 
religious practices.93 The Eleventh Circuit simply failed to do this, and 
instead engaged in an analysis that gave near absolute deference to the 
government at the expense of Knight’s religious rights. 
The Eleventh Circuit, in justifying its utilization of a lesser standard of 
scrutiny, stated that it was obligated under Cutter to give due deference to 
the extensive knowledge of the prison administrators, but that “[t]his 
deference is not . . . unlimited, and policies grounded on mere speculation, 
exaggerated fears, or post-hoc rationalizations will not suffice.”94 Yet, the 
court found persuasive testimony that inmates with long hair pose a threat 
to health and hygiene based on the recollection of a prison administrator 
describing “an incident in which a black widow spider wove a nest in an 
inmate’s dreadlocks.”95 Several of the ADOC’s witnesses also cited 
concerns that long hair posed a safety risk because “non-exempt inmates 
might attack exempted inmates out of jealousy” and “inmates can grab each 
other by the hair during fights”; however, “none of the ADOC’s witnesses 
could point to any instances where an inmate had attacked an exempted 
long-hair inmate out of jealousy or grabbed long hair during a fight.”96 The 
court here seems to be utilizing unlimited deference, and justifying policies 
based solely on “speculation and exaggerated fears.”97 
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The Eleventh Circuit also ignored Congress’ purpose in enacting the 
RLUIPA—to provide “a broad protection of religious exercise” for 
prisoners.98 Prisoners are a vulnerable class as they are under the care and 
control of the correctional facilities that house them. Prisoners must 
conform their behavior to follow whatever policies these correctional 
facilities impose upon them, or face consequences. Further, prisoners lack 
the capacity to opt-out of the rules set by correctional facilities. A prisoner 
cannot simply move to a facility with a more lenient grooming policy or 
decide not to conform to the policy by the very nature of their status as 
incarcerated people. In enacting the RLUIPA, Congress acknowledged the 
broad control prison officials have over inmates’ lives, and provided a 
means to curb abuses of power that infringe upon inmates’ rights to engage 
in religious practices.  
B. The Eleventh Circuit’s Burden Shifting: How the Court Should Have 
Ruled 
The Eleventh Circuit made a crucial error in interpreting the 
requirements of the RLUIPA. It shifted the ADOC’s burden of proving that 
the grooming policy was the least restrictive means of furthering its interest 
to Knight, and in doing so failed to utilize strict scrutiny in analyzing 
governmental policies infringing on prisoners religious rights as mandated 
under the RLUIPA. Instead, the Eleventh Circuit should have interpreted 
the RLUIPA as Congress intended, and applied strict scrutiny to the 
ADOC’s practices. By shifting the burden of proving least restrictive means 
from the ADOC to Knight, the Eleventh Circuit failed to interpret the 
RLUIPA in accordance with congressional intent in passing the law.  
Congress intended the RLUIPA to impose a high burden upon the 
policies of correctional facilities that restrict a prisoner’s rights to religious 
exercise. Because the purpose of correctional facilities should be 
rehabilitation, and because frustration of religious exercise frustrates the 
rehabilitation of inmates, Congress enacted this law in order to remove 
barriers impeding prisoner’s rehabilitation caused by the near absolute 
control over inmates exercised by corrections officers. For that reason, the 
RLUIPA is supposed to be interpreted broadly, and courts may only allow 
those policies that are necessary to be upheld under the expansive 
protections for religious exercise under this statute. 
The Eleventh Circuit should have taken this opportunity to adopt the 
standards set forth by the Ninth Circuit in Warsoldier as other jurisdictions 
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have done. If the court had done so, it would have found that the ADOC 
failed to meet its burden of least restrictive means. Under the proper 
standards for determining least restrictive means, the ADOC would have to 
show that it actually considered and rejected alternatives before adopting its 
restrictive grooming policy. Because the ADOC admitted it did not 
consider any alternatives to its policy before adopting it, the Eleventh 
Circuit should have overturned the policy as an impermissible restriction on 
Knight’s religious exercise. Further, the Eleventh Circuit should have 
considered the permissive grooming policies of other jurisdictions as 
persuasive evidence that corrections facilities can and do maintain order 
and control within their facilities, even with less restrictive policies.  
C. Implications of the Eleventh Circuit’s Decision 
The decision handed down in this case has immediate negative 
implications for Knight. The court here justified the ADOC’s imposition of 
its will to the detriment of Knight’s religious tenants. For Knight, the 
Eleventh Circuit’s ruling forces him to cut his hair. At first glance, a hair 
cut in and of itself does not seem to implicate dire consequences. However, 
for Knight—and many other Native Americans—hair length is intimately 
tied with spirituality, and one’s hair may only be shorn when in grieving.99 
By forcing Knight to cut his hair, the Eleventh Circuit is effectively 
endorsing “an assault on [his] sacredness” that impermissibly restricts 
Knight’s religious rights.  
This case and the restrictive grooming policies permitted in the Eleventh 
Circuit cause widespread harm throughout prison systems within its 
jurisdictional bounds. This case further reaffirms the Eleventh Circuit’s 
unilaterally permissive policies allowing prison officials to infringe upon 
the rights of inmates solely on the basis that they are inmates. Prisoners 
within these facilities are prohibited from engaging in all aspects of their 
religion. A person’s religious beliefs often correlate to their moralistic 
beliefs. The ultimate goal of correctional facilities should be the 
rehabilitation of inmates—if an inmate is prevented from fully practicing 
their religious beliefs, how is he to rehabilitate himself? In fact, in some 
instances the Eleventh Circuit has further hampered the rehabilitation of 
inmates by permitting the forced restraint and hair cutting of inmates in 
direct contradiction with their religious beliefs, as seen in Harris.100 
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By permitting the ADOC unfettered deference in setting restrictive 
grooming policies, the Eleventh Circuit continues to perpetuate two 
historical practices to the detriment of its citizenry: further inhibition of 
inmate rehabilitation and perpetuation of historical practices of 
colonization. The Eleventh Circuit approvingly consented to a policy that 
causes both direct and indirect social harm by permitting this seemingly 
innocuous grooming policy to go unchecked. This decision: (1) 
immediately hurts inmates by preventing them from engaging fully in their 
religion; (2) furthers continual practices of violations of prisoners’ rights; 
(3) harms the larger society by impeding inmate rehabilitation, thus 
potentially leading to higher incarceration rates as unrehabilitated prisoners 
engage in further offenses once released; (4) fails to fully uphold the 
RLUIPA in accordance with congressional intent; and (5) perpetuates 
continued practices of colonization and suppression of religious exercise 
against Native Americans. 
D. The Eleventh Circuit’s Ruling in a Broader Context: Native Americans 
and the Continued Judicial Approval of Colonization 
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision imposes additional harm upon Native 
American prisoners in particular by perpetuating historical colonization 
practices against Native American prisoners. Many Native Americans 
associate the keeping of long hair with their spiritual beliefs.101 Further, 
history shows that Native Americans in particular have faced undue 
pressure from outsiders to conform their religious beliefs to more closely 
match those of mainstream society. The United States has utilized 
missionaries to convert and assimilate Native Americans throughout 
history.102 They aimed to eradicate Native American religious beliefs and 
instead impose Christianity upon Native Americans through colonization.103 
The United States has imposed several restrictive laws banning the practice 
of certain Native American religious activities, including outlawing 
ceremonies such as the Ghost Dance and Sun Dance seen throughout Plains 
tribal cultures.104 Further, the United States has historically used boarding 
schools as a means of “civilizing” Native Americans by forcibly removing 
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Native American children from their homes, refusing to allow them to 
speak any language except English, and compelling them to engage in 
Christianity.105 These boarding schools stripped Native American children 
of their families, their language, their culture, and their religion.106 A major 
tenant of this practice was the required cutting of Native American 
children’s long hair.107 The boarding school staff ceremoniously sheared the 
hair of each child to provide for uniformity, order, and civility.108 Much like 
the restrictive policies the United States has repeatedly enforced throughout 
history, the policy of the ADOC further compels this legacy of religious 
intolerance, backed by the force of the Eleventh Circuit judiciary.  
Outside of the context of the RLUIPA, Congress has enacted laws 
particularly addressing Native American religious rights and the special 
considerations the government must afford to Native American religious 
beliefs due to its prior history of suppression and assimilation. In 1978, 
Congress passed the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA).109 
The AIRFA intended to address the historical practices of the United States 
government that repeatedly infringed upon the rights of Native Americans 
to engage in their religious practices. It states, “it shall be the policy of the 
United States to protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent 
right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the[ir] traditional 
religions.”110 On its face, the AIRFA appears to provide for the 
accommodation of Native American religious practices, such as the wearing 
of long hair. It recognizes that the American government has not always 
provided due protections to Native Americans’ religious practices, and that 
particular attention must be afforded to ensure that prior practices do not 
continue to infringe upon the rights of Native Americans to engage in their 
traditional religious practices. In theory, it should compel governmental 
actors into promoting the accommodation of these religious beliefs.  
The AIRFA should work alongside laws like the RLUIPA to ensure that 
the government does not impose undue burdens upon Native American 
religious practices. However, “[t]he suppression of [Native American 
religious] practices has been pervasive to such a degree that AIRFA has 
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proven to be insufficient to grant the freedom that many Native Americans 
feel is necessary for the complete affirmation of their respective religious 
identities.”111 Cases interpreting the AIRFA have systematically 
extinguished any chance of utilizing this law to afford protection to Native 
American religious rights, and have reduced the AIRFA to a mere policy 
statement, affording no additional protections than that conferred to Native 
Americans by the First Amendment.112 It provides for no cause of action or 
redressability of infringement upon these rights.113 In the context of 
prisoners, the AIRFA has been held to not create any additional obligations 
upon prison officials to accommodate Native American religious beliefs.114 
In interpreting the AIRFA, the judiciary has systematically annihilated any 
additional protections for Native American religious practices that do not 
already exist under the First Amendment, and has effectively nullified this 
act of Congress. The AIRFA exists now as mere lip service to the 
protection of Native American religions, and provides no statutory 
protections to the continued abuses Native Americans face in practicing 
their religious beliefs. 
VI. Conclusion 
The decision handed down in Knight is troubling in that it (1) ignores 
federal policy upholding religious liberties for all citizens, (2) contradicts 
precedent set by other circuits correctly applying the strict scrutiny test 
found in the RLUIPA, (3) places a vulnerable (if not well-liked) class of 
citizens—prisoners—at risk for violations of their religious beliefs, (4) 
inhibits the rehabilitation of prisoners, and (5) continues the legacy of 
suppression of Native American religious exercise. Prisoners are especially 
vulnerable to oppressive policies inhibiting their right to exercise their 
religious beliefs. The purpose of the American penal system is punishment 
for violations of law and rehabilitation to prevent future infractions. 
Restricting religious practice is directly contradictory to this important 
policy.  
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In ruling in favor of the ADOC, the Eleventh Circuit further perpetuates 
a cycle of harm to freedom for Native American religious exercise. Native 
Americans have been especially targeted throughout the history of this 
country for violations of their religious rights. Here, the Eleventh Circuit 
upheld colonizing policies that cause further harm to Native American 
inmates, and further inhibits the ability of inmates (like Ricky Knight) to 
rehabilitate themselves and heal themselves from the damages imposed by a 
colonizing government. In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit continues 
historical practices preventing religious freedom in direct contradiction with 
one of the founding principles of this nation. 
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